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By Joel M. Gora
WILLIAM J. Brennan Jr. celebrates two
milestones this year: his 80th birthday
and his 30th anniversary as an associate
justice of the Supreme Court. The latter
occasion will place him in a select circle;
in this century only Hugo L. Black and
William 0. Douglas have served as long.
His tenure has encompassed seven presi-
dencies, and his hundreds of opinions
span 120 volumes of the U.S. Reports.
His three decades on the Court have
witnessed turbulent changes in the nation
and the world. The Court itself has exper-
ienced both the extraordinary develop-
ments of doctrine associated with the
Warren Court and the major retrench-
ments identified with the Burger Court.
On the Warren Court, Brennan was at
the center of innovation; under the re-
gime of Chief Justice Burger, Brennan is
a prominent dissenter, Writing more
often for history than for the Court.
No one could have foreseen this devel-
opment in 1956, when President Eisen-
hower, adhering to a policy of appointing
distinguished and moderate appellate
court judges, but not unmindful of the
electoral advantages, named Justice
Brennan-a Northern, urban, Irish
Catholic Democrat-to the Supreme
Court. Raised in Newark, N.J., as one of
eight children of a self-made, well-
respected public official, Brennan was an
honors graduate of the University of
Pennsylvania and of Harvard Law
School. After graduation in 1931, he
joined a prominent Newark law firm and
specialized in the emerging field of labor
law.
Following wartime military service as a
manpower troubleshooter and negotia-
tor, Brennan returned to law practice in
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Newark and became involved in drafting
major changes in the New Jersey judici-
ary as part of a new state constitution.
Decades later, he would play a major role
in urging the use of state constitutions as
an additional source of protection for
individual rights. In 1949, he was ap-
pointed to the state trial court and, in
rapid succession, to the appellate court
and in 1952 to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, a collegial tribunal where Bren-
nan developed the consensus-building
skills that would characterize much of his
work on the Supreme Court.
The Court that Justice Brennan joined
had no clear direction or identity. The
school desegregation decisions had not
yet been implemented, and concepts like
affirmative action had not even been ar-
ticulated. First Amendment doctrine was
mostly a function of ad hoc decision-
making as the Court grappled with the
issues posed by Communist Party advoca-
cy and association. The rights of the
accused, too, were determined by case-
by-case adjudication, and the major re-
forms that would protect defendants
against the excesses of local law enforce-
ment were years away.
Notions of using the Constitution to
protect private choice on intimate mat-
ters such as contraception, abortion and
sexual privacy or preference would have
seemed visionary. Problems raised by
grossly malapportioned state legislatures
were viewed as political questions not
subject to constitutional measure. In-
deed, constitutional restraints seemed
largely irrelevant to the conduct of gov-
ernment at the state and local levels.
Through a blend of pragmatism and
principle, with an ebullient, gregarious
and easy personal manner, Justice Bren-
nan helped change all that.
Landmark opinions
Within a decade, Justice Brennan
would write for the Court such landmark
opinions as NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963), which recognized public in-
terest litigation as a valid form of political
advocacy; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), which prevented governments
from penalizing religious freedom by
withholding benefits from religious ob-
servers; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
the case that dramatically expanded the
scope of federal habeas corpus review of
state criminal convictions; New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), which protected citizen-critics of
public officials from punitive defamation
suits and in the process effected major
reforms in First Amendment doctrine
and perception; and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), which held that chal-
lenges to malapportionment were consti-
tutionally justiciable under the equal pro-
tection clause and changed the face of
American politics for all time.
The aggregate impact of Button, Sulli-
van and Baker has been to make possible
the major issue movements of the past 20
years-civil rights, equal rights, environ-
mental protection, consumer protection
and the anti-war movement by safe-
guarding legal and citizen advocacy of
causes and ensuring responsive legisla-
tures. Justice Brennan also would play a
major role in making the protections of
the Bill of Rights available to criminal
defendants in state and local proceedings.
Having had that impact would be ca-
reer enough for most justices. But in
Justice Brennan's case, it was only the tip
of the iceberg.
He has fashioned concepts and devel-
oped doctrines that have become part of
the very vocabulary of constitutional law.
In the First Amendment area, the con-
cerns that freedom of expression needs
"breathing space" and that laws regulat-
ing speech must not produce the chilling
effect of self-censorship were articulated
by Justice Brennan.
In the famed Pentagon Papers case,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971), the only common
ground that united six justices in the
short per curiam decision that lifted the
injunctions against the press was a princi-
ple stated by Justice Brennan a decade
earlier: "Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity." Bantam Books v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
The "right-privilege" distinction-
popularized by one of Justice Holmes'
more famous epigrams ("the petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman") was rejected in a
series of opinions by Justice Brennan in
which he observed: "It is too late in the
day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by deni-
al of or placing of conditions upon a
benefit or privilege." This concept also
would play an important role in affording
due process protections to recipients of
social welfare benefits.
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Justice Brennan's refusal in the 1963
Button case to allow the use of "mere
labels," such as "solicitation" of legal
business, to place speech outside the pale
of First Amendment protection played a
vital role in later cases extending'that
protection in cases of defamation, offen-
sive remarks and commercial speech.
His 1966 ruling that Congress pos-
sessed the power to expand, but not
restrict, the meaning of equal protection
under the 14th Amendment, Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, drew much
academic criticism. This theory was qui-
etly reaffirmed by the Court in a 1982
opinion written by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718.
Justice Brennan's protection of person-
al choice regarding contraception in a
1972 case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, played an important role a year later
in Justice Harry Blackmun's landmark
abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
Robust debate
Lastly, his analysis of the core purposes
of the First Amendment in the 1964
Sullivan decision, identifying the "pro-
found national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"
coupled with his observation a year later
that "speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the es-
sence of self-government," have in-
formed a generation about the central
meaning of freedom of expression in a
democratic society.
During the early Warren years, Justice
Brennan's opinions usually sought the
narrow ground in order to achieve a
majority. During the heyday of the War-
ren era, from 1962 to 1969, he was the
"playmaker" for the Court, fashioning
agreement on the broader statements of
constitutional principle associated with
that period. But even then, Justice Bren-
nan frequently steered a pragmatic path
between ad hoc resolution and absolu-
tist doctrine-the Sullivan case, for
example, afforded the press extensive
protection from defamation suits, but not
the absolute immunity that Justices Black
and Douglas urged.
In the years since then, Justice Bren-
nan's role has changed markedly. Though
on occasion he still orchestrates impor-
tant rulings, he is more often in dissent,
frequently chiding the Court for its de-
parture from Warren Court rulings and
occasionally questioning the majority's
good faith-particularly in the many
cases in which Justice Rehnquist au-
thored the Court's ruling.
He serves now as the Court's con-
science, the keeper of the flame, pointing
to the more enduring constitutional prin-
ciples that the Court's decisions too often
denigrate or ignore.
But Justice Brennan has not been un-
failingly liberal. In his 1957 opinion in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, he
ruled that obscenity, narrowly defined,
was not part of "the freedom of speech,"
a position he altered years later, too late
for a more normal First Amendment
approach. Justice Brennan's 1966 ruling
in the Ralph Ginzburg case, (Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463), upholding
an obscenity conviction because of the
manner in which the materials were mar-
keted, was, as one observer put it, "not
to his credit."
That same year, his decision that the
compulsory extraction of blood samples
from a suspected drunk driver did not
amount to "testimonial compulsion" and
thus was not barred by the privilege
against self-incrimination drew dissents
from the Court's liberal wing.
Throughout these periods, however,
there has been a remarkable consistency
to Brennan's views of constitutional prin-
ciples. The guiding vision he consistently
invokes is "the constitutional ideal of
libertarian dignity protected through
law." The principles that inform this vi-
sion are manifest in his jurisprudence.
Individual autonomy
First is a commitment to individual
autonomy and privacy. He has been a
vigorous champion of Fourth Amend-
ment rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination,
which together create "nothing less than
a comprehensive right of personal liberty
in the face of governmental intrusion."
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963)(dissent). Accordingly, he has bit-
terly opposed the recent erosion of the
Fourth Amendment-based exclusionary
rule and of the protections associated
with the Miranda decision.
Concern for individual autonomy also
can be seen in Justice Brennan's opinions
in the areas of sexual freedom, family
planning and the right of intimate associ-
ation, which reflect his appreciation of a
domain of personal choice, a sanctuary
free from official coercion or compulsion.
Finally, Justice Brennan's development
of First Amendment barriers to self-
censorship reflects a similar sense that
individuals must be left free to engage in
speech and association.
Equality is another component of liber-
tarian dignity, and Justice Brennan has
been a vigorous advocate of eliminating
all forms of second-class citizenship. He
has written key decisions in the area of
school desegregation that provide the
lower courts with effective remedial
tools. He has written movingly against
laws that discriminate against minorities
by imposing a majority's views of appro-
priate family living arrangements and
uses of language. Justice Brennan has
been in the forefront of judicial efforts to
secure constitutional equality for women.
His 1973 opinion holding that gender
classifications were, like race and nation-
al origin, suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny fell one vote short of command-
ing a majority of the Court. Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677. Three years
later, he fashioned a consensus on the
slightly less demanding standard of re-
view for gender-based distinctions that
the: Court has employed ever since to
invalidate most such laws. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190. In a tour de force in
1982, Justice Brennan persuaded a ma-
jority to join him in holding that laws that
deprive illegal alien children of a free
public education help to perpetuate a
permanent underclass and are inconsis-
tent with our principles of equality under
law. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202. And, of
course, his reapportionment decision in
Baker v. Carr made a critical contribution
to the goal of equal political rights.
Human dignity is another foundation
of Justice Brennan's vision. He has insist-
ed that laws allocating social welfare ben-
efits comport with the requirements of
due process and equal protection. Em-
ploying principles of equal treatment, he
wrote for the Court in 1969 that since
such laws condition "the ability of the
families to obtain the very means to
subsist-food, shelter, and other necessi-
ties of life," a one-year residency waiting
period, which both deprived people of
necessities and hampered their ability to
move into the community, would be sub-
ject to strict constitutional scrutiny. Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618.
A year later, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, he persuaded the Court that
individuals claiming a statutory entitle-
ment to welfare assistance were entitled
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by due process to a hearing before a
decision could be reached that they no
longer were eligible for benefits, a princi-
ple that was quickly applied to other
government largesse and licenses. While
these decisions have been buffeted con-
siderably by later Burger Court rulings,
their sense of decency and dignity sur-
vives.
His concern for human dignity also has
caused Justice Brennan to dissent in all
cases involving the imposition of the
death penalty. As he recently put it: "The
calculated killing of a human being by the
State involves, by its very nature, an
absolute denial of the executed person's
humanity. The most vile murder does
not, in my view, release the State from
constitutional restraints on the destruc-
tion of human dignity."
Official accountability
But one pervasive theme informs Jus-
tice Brennan's vision of libertarian digni-
-ty: the concept of official accountability.
This theme may be his most enduring
contribution to constitutional law. It
takes three basic forms: procedural, judi-
cial and political.
Procedural accountability is designed
to ensure a first line of defense against
arbitrary official actions. Reflecting the
former trial lawyer's appreciation of the
role of procedural safeguards in protect-
ing substantive rights, this theme can be
seen in much of Justice Brennan's work:
insisting in the First Amendment area on
placing the burden of proof on the censor
and not the speaker; requiring fair proce-
dures before government benefits may be
withheld or withdrawn from a presum-
ably entitled beneficiary; in criminal law,
articulating the need for having lawyers
present at lineups, for requiring Miranda
warnings, and for an independent magis-
trate to safeguard Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable search-
es and seizures.
In the Leon case in 1984, Justice Bren-
nan bitterly dissented when the Court
held that the police might reasonably rely
on a defective warrant simply because a
magistrate issued it. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897. Very recently, the
Court declined review in a case where a
magistrate had issued an arguably defec-
tive warrant simply because the police
requested one. Justice Brennan summa-
rized the operation of the two rules: "The
combined message of Leon and the
Court's refusal to grant certiorari in this
case is that the police may rely on the
magistrates and the magistrates may rely
on the police. On whom may the citizens
rely to protect their Fourth Amendment
rights?" McCommon v. Mississippi, 106
S. Ct. 393 (1985).
Justice Brennan also seeks official ac-
countability through vigorous judicial re-
view. He has been a champion of in-
creased access to the federal courts and
the primary Court advocate of an expan-
sive interpretation of state constitutions
by state courts.
Linking the two approaches is his view
that "one of the strengths of our federal
system is that it provides a double source
of protection for the rights of our citi-
zens." Thus, he dramatically broadened
the range of federal habeas corpus review
of state criminal convictions because the
Great Writ's "root principle is that in a
civilized society, government must always
be accountable to the judiciary for a
man's imprisonment." Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963).
Justice Brennan has been the principal
author of a number of key decisions vita-
lizing the statutory cause of action to
redress violations of federal rights by
state and local officials, and it was his
ruling that fashioned a constitutional
cause of action for damages against feder-
al officials who violate citizens' rights.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
In recent years he has vehemently pro-
tested the federal courts' excessive use of
abstention, standing and other "door-
closing" devices because he views those
courts as the "primary and powerful reli-
ances for vindicating" federal rights.
Hallmarks of democracy
But perhaps Justice Brennan's most
important contribution has been to foster
the principles of political accountability.
Democracy turns not so much on govern-
ment's accountability to the courts, but to
In October, Justice Brennan will have
spent 30 years on the Supreme Court.
He turned 80 in April.. His wife, Mary,
worked for the Court for 40 years.
the people. His decisions have played a
central role in expanding uninhibited dis-
cussion of public matters and in ensuring
equal participation in political
determinations-the dual hallmarks of a
democratic society.
Justice Brennan's career on the Court
compels consideration of one final issue
of accountability, which is the perpetual
paradox of judicial review in a democra-
cy: to whom shall the judges be accounta-
ble? There are, to be sure, many con-
straints on the Court-constitutional,
institutional, precedential and pro-
fessional-but these mark the outer
boundaries of judicial power. In the main
the justices are unfettered in their inter-
pretation of the Constitution's text and
principles. This phenomenon has in-
trigued scholars, cautioned judges and oc-
casionally, as now, angered political lead-
ers into calls for "strict construction."
Recently, these issues have been raised
by Attorney General Edwin Meese, who,
in a widely publicized speech to the
American Bar Association's annual
meeting last year, criticized a number of
Court rulings as "more policy choices
than articulations of constitutional princi-
ple" and urged, instead, a "jurisprudence
of original intention." Several weeks
later, Justice Brennan took the unusual
step of commenting on such views at a
law school symposium:
"We current Justices read the Con-
stitution in the only way that we can: as
20th century Americans. We look to the
history of the time of framing and to the
intervening history of interpretation. But
the ultimate question must be, what do
the words of the text mean in our time.
For the genius of the Constitution rests
not in any static meaning it might have
had in a world that is dead and gone, but
in the adaptability of its great principles
to cope with current problems and cur-
rent needs. What the constitutional fun-
damentals meant to the wisdom of other-
times cannot be their measure to the
vision of our time."
The democratic leap of faith that the
paradox of judicial review requires, in
entrusting to the justices of the Court the
articulation 'of constitutional principles,
has been amply vindicated in the case of
Justice Brennan. His colleague and
friend, Chief Justice Warren, remarked
20 years ago that Justice Brennan "ad-
ministers the Constitution as a sacred
trust." Through the many changes in the
Court that his tenure has encompassed,
Justice Brennan has remained remark-
ably faithful to that trust.
._../rs/
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